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A PRACTITIONER'S SYMPOSIUM
ON THE RECENT SUPREME
COURT TAKINGS CASES

INTRODUCTION
William Ginsberg*
The SUPREME COURT of the United States does not speak
often on critical land use issues. Most of the controversies concerning
permissible uses of privately owned real estate are resolved in state
courts. Recently, however, two Supreme Court decisions were rendered which may have a considerable impact on the public regulation of private land. First English Lutheran Church v. County of
Los Angeles, (often referred to as the "First English" case) was decided on June 9, 1987,1 and Nollan v. California Coastal Commission was decided on June 26, 1987.1
As with many Supreme Court decisions, both First English and
Nollan were rendered by a divided court. In the former, the majority
decision was written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justice Stevens
wrote a dissent which was joined, in part, by Justices Blackmun and
O'Connor. In the Nollan case the majority decision was by Justice
Scalia. Justice Brennan wrote a dissent in which Justice Marshall
joined, and Justices Blackmun and Stevens also wrote dissents.
The First English case involved a county ordinance which totally prohibited construction on canyon land owned by the plaintiffs
and others. A creek in the canyon had overflowed its banks the year
before the ordinance was enacted, flooding the plaintiff's property
and destroying all of the buildings on it. The property had been used
* Rivkin Radler, Dunne & Bayh Distinguished Professor of Environmental Law, Hofstra
University School of Law. J.D. 1955, Yale University; B.A. 1952, Antioch College.
1. 107 S. Ct 2378 (1987).
2. 107 S. Ct 3141 (1987).
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as a recreation area for handicapped children.
The Court did not invalidate the ordinance which, as the dissent
noted, was almost certainly valid, nor did it determine that there had
been an unconstitutional uncompensated "taking" of the church's
land. In fact, there is considerable doubt whether the complaint in
the case even alleged that such a taking had occurred. The decision
only determined that if the ordinance did deny the church all use of
its property, and if the church could prove the damages caused by
such a temporary taking, then the plaintiff church was entitled to
damages from the time the ordinance was enacted until the time it
was determined that a taking had occurred. The case was then sent
back to a lower court to determine whether, in fact, a taking had
occurred, and if so, the amount of damage the plaintiff suffered because of the temporary loss of use.
It is fair to say that there is considerable doubt whether the
plaintiff in First English will ever be entitled to a nickel as a result
of the litigation. The general validity of zoning and other land use
legislation was not questioned. Historically, since zoning was held to
be constitutional in the Supreme Court's landmark 1926 decision in
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,' litigants have had little
success in showing that land use regulation constitutes "taking" of
affected property. The First English decision only holds that if such
a taking is found because the landowner is denied "all" use of the
property, then compensation must be paid to the landowner for the
period during which the invalid regulation prevented use of the land.
The key issue is the requirement to pay temporary damages.
In the Nollan case, the vote on the Court divided 5 to 4. The
Nollans owned a 504 square-foot beach house. They requested a permit from the California Coastal Commission to tear down the structure and build a new 1,674 square-foot house with an attached twocar garage. This would have resulted in development covering 2,464
square-feet of a 3,000 square-foot lot. Apparently the Commission
could legally have denied the request but granted it instead, on the
condition that the Nollans give the public an easement to walk
across a ten-foot wide strip of beach in front of their property. A
similar condition had been accepted by 43 neighboring property
owners to facilitate access to nearby public beaches. The Nollans
refused.
The majority of the Court supported the Nollans on the ground
3.

272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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that the need for public access was not created by the construction
of the larger house, and was totally unrelated to the building proposal. It did not serve the same "governmental purpose" as the restriction on development. The minority disagreed with this analysis and
also pointed out that since the Coastal Commission had the power to
deny the permit completely, the decision to grant it subject to a condition could not constitute an unconstitutional infringement of property rights. The rule of the Nollan case would, therefore, appear to
be that conditions may be imposed when a land use permit is
granted, as long as those conditions bear a relationship to mitigating
the impact of the proposed development.
While the litigation was pending, the Nollans had proceeded
with their construction without a permit. Thus the compensation issue raised in the First English case was not relevant.
It is, of course, too soon to evaluate the ramifications of these
decisions. That has not, however, prevented many people from doing
so. Some, for personal, political or economic reasons, have erroneously concluded that traditional zoning and other land use control
ordinances are of doubtful validity, and that any "up-zoning" or increased restrictions will run afoul of the law. As a result, communities might have to make enormous compensation payments. (This
latter argument against land use regulations was quick to be voiced
on the Upper Delaware by the opponents of the Upper Delaware
Management Plan. - Ed.) Others are simply confused by the complexity of the issues, or are basing their reaction on analysis of the
decisions themselves.
Controversy is to be expected whenever important issues are decided by a narrowly divided Court. Even if one disagrees with a Supreme Court decision, however, it is the ultimate arbiter of the issues
before it. The most important question, therefore, is what effect
these decisions will have on the future governmental regulation of
private property.
The initial perception has been that the impact will be substantial, yet a close reading of both the First English and Nollan cases
indicates that this should not be so. While Nollan addresses the permissible boundaries of such regulation, and First English deals with
the period for which compensation to the private owner is due if regulation oversteps its bounds, neither casts any doubt on the legality
of limiting private property rights to achieve legitimate public
objectives.
With the passage of time, we may discover that much of the
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initial reaction to these decisions was erroneous or exaggerated.
However, as Justice Stevens wrote in his dissent in the First English
case, "One thing is certain. The Court's decision today will generate
a great deal of litigation. Most of it, I believe, will be
unproductive.""
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